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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 88029

vs.
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, ET AL,
Defendants/Respondents
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action sounding in trot that was originally
filed by the Plaintiff as an action against three

(3) police

officers from three (3) different jurisdictions for assault and
other improper conduct that arose from an incident that happened
at Plaintiff's home on the late evening hours of August 28, 1983
and the early morning hours of August 29, 1983.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Following the filing of a Notice of Readiness For Trial,
after discovery had been completed and just immediately prior to
a Trial which had been set for some time, Defendants' filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the basis of certain statute of limitations
violations.
The Plaintiff sought to amend the Complaint to allege a
continuous tort of false imprisonment and other unlawful conduct.
Following
November

2,

two

(2) hearings,

1987, the

Motion

to

on

September

Amend

was

14, 1987 and

denied

and the

Defendants7 were granted Summary Judgment.
That Judgment was filed on November 16, 1987 and an appeal
1

was

taken

to

the

Supreme

Court

on December

16, 1987 which

transferred the case to this Court on March 4, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED
1.

Whether the concept of continuous tort is applicable to

the allegations of this case.
2.

Whether the Court erred in not granting Plaintiff's

request to amend the Complaint prior to Trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(The following fact statement is taken from the
pleadings in the case, including Plaintiff's
Affidavit and the Memoranda supplied at the
time of the Summary Judgment Hearings. There
has been no Evidentiary Hearing in the case
and therefore, citations will not be to an
Evidentiary Transcript, but the facts are
based upon the allegations contained in those
various pleadings.)
In the late evening hours, approximately

10:30 p.m., of

August 28, 1983, the Plaintiff, along with other friends were
returning the Plaintiff's home located in Washington Terrace,
Utah

from a boating excursion at Pineview Reservoir east of

Ogden, Utah.
At that time, Plaintiff was a passenger in a motorhome which
was driven by her boyfriend, Jerry Wells.

The motorhome was

owned by him and registered to him.
That upon entering Washington Terrace City, a Washington
Terrace police officer pulled behind the motorhome and pulled up
to the motorhome as it parked in front of the Plaintiff's home.
Plaintiff

exited

the

motorhome

and

entered

her

home.

Shortly thereafter, apparently the officers had probable cause to
2
•

\

believe that Jerry Wells had been driving while intoxicated and
proceeded to arrest him and also proceeded to attempt to arrest
others who they believed were involved in public intoxication.
Subsequent

to

the

Plaintiff

entering

her

home,

the

Washington Terrace officers called for assistance from officers
from Riverdale City and South Ogden City, adjacent jurisdictions.
At this time, no arrest was made of the Plaintiff.

The officers
i

entered her home, without knocking and without any authorization
and initially requested that she move the motorhome.
After informing the officers that the motorhome did not
belong to her, a verbal argument ensued.

The Plaintiff was then

accosted initially by Washington Terrace officers and then by
Riverdale officers and South Ogden officers and was physically
beaten and abused.

Plaintiff was dragged from the interior of

her home to the porch and then out onto the driveway area and
subdued.
At

this

time,

Plaintiff

was

not

arrested,

but

was

transported by the officers to the McKay Dee Hospital, which was
approximately ten (10) miles away.

Plaintiff was not released

from the McKay Dee Hospital until approximately 1:00 a.m. on
August 29, 1983.

Following her release, Plaintiff was then

handcuffed, placed

into a patrol car and taken to the Weber

County Jail in Ogden where she was booked at approximately 1:30
a.m. on August 29, 198 3.
At that time, Plaintiff was formally arrested on a number of
charges, including resisting arrest, inferring with an officer
3

and disturbing the peace.

Plaintiff remained incarcerated in the

Weber County Jail until she was able to arrange bail and was
released shortly before noon on August 29, 1983.
The officers then proceeded

to file Complaints with the

Washington Terrace City Attorney's Office and a prosecution then
ensued on misdemeanor counts for the above referenced charges.
At the time of Plaintiff's trial, some two (2) months later,
all charges but one, the disorderly conduct, was dismissed and
Plaintiff plead guilty to a plea bargain arrangement to that
charge.
At the time of the plea bargain, there was no agreement on
the part of the Plaintiff that she would not take legal action
against the City, the various police agencies and the officers
involved, nor was there any factual determination by the Court
that the charge of disturbing the peace justified any of the
officers actions, either prior to or subsequent to the alleged
conduct.

i

The Plaintiff initially filed her Notice of Claim against
Riverdale, Washington Terrace and South Ogden Cities and the
named officers in this case, Dean Jensen, Wallerstein and Steve
Smith, on August 29, 1984.

All Cities were served on the same

day.
Plaintiff contended

that no City specifically

responded,

either affirmatively or negatively to the Notice of Claim and the
lawsuit was initiated on November 27, 1985.
Following

the

initiation
4

of

the lawsuit, all three

(3)

(

entities and the three (3) named officers were represented by
counsel.

Interrogatories were submitted which were answered by

the Plaintiff, numerous settlement discussions were entertained,
but none came to fruition and a period of almost two (2) years
passed when the matter was finally set for trial.
That some three (3) weeks before the trial was set to begin,
the Defendants, for the first time, filed Motions for Summary
Judgment, claiming that the statute of

limitations had been

violated.
The basis of the claim was that the focus of the lawsuit was
on the actual assault of the Plaintiff by the Defendants, which
occurred at the time the officers entered her home and drug her
therefrom at approximately 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m. on August 28,
1983.
Plaintiff
September
continuous

took the position

at the

14, 1987, that it considered
incident, beginning

initial hearing, on
the

incident

as one

in the late evening hours and

continuing through her transportation to the jail, the booking
and her incarceration in the jail until noon on the 29th.
Plaintiff requested from the Court that the Complaint be
amended to conform to the facts.

The Court took this matter

under advisement and allowed the Plaintiff to prepare an amended
Complaint.
At that time, the Court also ruled, without objection from
the Plaintiff, that based upon the present status of the law of
the State of Utah, that the Cities could not be individually held
5

as responsible parties in the lawsuit and that the only parties
which

could

statute

remain

of

in

limitations

Accordingly,

the

the

lawsuit, pending

problem,

Cities

was

were

the

a

ruling

three

dismissed.

(3)

In

on

the

officers.

the

amended

Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the tort of false imprisonment and
false arrest as part of the continuing actions of the tortuous
conduct of the Defendants.
The
further

matter

was

hearing.

then

continued

On November

2,

to

November

19871 for

2,

1987, the Judge denied

the

Plaintiff the opportunity to raise false imprisonment and false
arrest,

claiming

that

it

changed

the

basic

character

of

the

lawsuit and further, found that the conduct, although beginning
on

the

28th

and

continuing

to

the

29th, was

not

of

such

a

continuous tortuous nature that it could be brought into a suit
for

which

the

claim

was

filed

on

the

29th

and

therefore,

determined that the claim was outside the statute of limitations
and did not reach the other factual issues of the case.

1

Summary Judgment was therefore granted and it is from that
decision that the Plaintiff appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff to amend the
Complaint prior to the trial to conform to the facts.
POINT I

<

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT AT THE
PRETRIAL HEARING WHICH WOULD HAVE
DEFEATED DEFENDANTS7 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
ARGUMENT
6
i

It is a well settled rule in the Trial Courts of this State,
that because Utah is a Notice rather than a code pleading State,
that the Courts have broad discretion to allow either party to a
lawsuit to amend its pleadings, either prior to the Trial or even
during or at the end of Trial to conform the facts and evidence
presented, as long as parties are not prejudiced therefrom.
In this case, Plaintiff contends that the Court abused its
discretion in not allowing an amendment to the Complaint prior to
a trial.
There is no question that Plaintiff's original Complaint in
this

action

deliberate

focused
and

on the

intentional

issue of assaultive behavior, a
tortuous

act

by

the

Defendants.

However, it is also clear, and Defendants were certainly on
notice, that the acts complained of were in the course of their
duties as police officers when they effected an arrest and later,
after returning the Plaintiff who they had beaten severely enough
to require hospitalization, booked into a jail and incarcerated
her for a period

of time and then later prosecuted her for

alleged offenses.
All of the Defendants knew that the lawsuit arose out of
this

conduct,

although

it

was

not

specifically

plead.

Interrogatories were requested of the Plaintiff by some of the
Defendants and were provided to counsel for all Defendants, where
Plaintiff specifically addressed the issue of what happened to
her on the late evening hours of the 28th and the early morning
hours of the 29th of August, 1983.
7

There is no question that all parties to the suit knew
before any of the Summary Judgment Motions were filed, that the
entirety of the offense covered a two (2) day period and involved
an assault, an arrest, an incarceration and a prosecution.
Yet Defendants, through counsel, at the time of the hearing,
expressed dismay that counsel was now attempting to amend to
specifically address the false imprisonment and false prosecution
issues.
It is Plaintiff's contention that in effect, under Utah law
and the common practice in the Courts, that the Complaint could
have been amended at the time of trial to encompass these issues,
but the amendment was made before trial, no one was prejudiced,
all the evidence was preserved, it did nothing to change the
case, except that it completely destroys any argument that the
Defendants had with respect to the statute of limitations of the
initial Notice of Claim, without even contemplating the issue of
continuous tort, if in fact the Complaint was amended, to allow
for false imprisonment, false arrest and improper prosecution,
these actions clearly took place on the 29th, not on the 28th and
Plaintiff's

Notice

was

therefore,

within

the

statute

of

limitations.
In effect, in this case, the Court had to determine whether
to completely cut the Plaintiff off from any remedy because of
the one year statute of limitations violation or to allow in its
discretion, the amendment and preserve the case so that the
merits could be addressed.
8
<

Plaintiff contends that the Court should examine legislative
and

historical

reasons

for

the

statute

of

limitations.

Essentially, the statute of limitations was enacted to encourage
judicial economy and to encourage the bringing of lawsuits with
expedition and in a timely fashion so that all parties to the
lawsuit will have fresh evidence and be able to sustain their
position without the lapse of time.
The statute in question here is 63-30-13, which allows a one
(1) year period to sue a municipality or an employee thereof for
actions arising out of their work.

Therefore, we are not talking

about a two, three, four, six or seven year statute of limitation
as many others.
Even considering the evidence in the light more favorable to
the Defendants, the case was filed just (1) day or just a few
hours after the one year lapse of the statute.
Every equitable argument in this case argues in favor of
allowing an amendment so that Plaintiff's case can be heard.
This is simply not a case where the evidence is stale, where
undue delay was caused, but simply if anything, a mistake on the
part of the Plaintiff as to the sequence of events surrounding a
very unpleasant experience for her.
The Court, sitting as a Court of equity, should have allowed
the amendment which would have therefore, allowed Plaintiff's
Claim

to

have

been

timely

under

limitations period.

9

the

applicable

statute

of

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
DEFENDANTS, ACTIONS OF AUGUST 2 8TH AND
2 9TH CONSTITUTED A CONTINUOUS TORT,
WHICH CLAIM WOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT
Plaintiff

contends

strongly,

that

the

actions

of

the

officers in this case constituted a continuous sequence of events
which began at the very least, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on
August 28, 1983 and ended at approximately 1:30 a.m. on August
29, 1983.
The Plaintiff takes the position that this entire episode
was a continuing tortuous act, beginning the verbal and battery
at her home, continuing in the police vehicle and ending with the
arrest, booking and incarceration at the Weber County Jail.
The Defendants did not deny that the matter extended over a
period of two to three hours on both dates, but claimed that the
Plaintiff could not recover for any specific actions which took
place on the 28th, but only those which took place on the 29th
and the Court of course, determined that if it was limited to
those actions and the Court refused to allow the Plaintiff to
amend the Complaint to focus on only those issues.
Although the

Plaintiff has

found no Utah

cases bearing

directly on this issue, the Court is directed to the following
cases and their analysis:
Kenneth

L. Baker v.

Burbank, Glendale, Pasadena Airport

Authorities, 705 P.2d 866, (1985) California.

In this case, the

Supreme Court of California discussed the tort of nuisance and
10

recognized that with respect to tortuous acts and the statute of
limitations, a Trial Court must make a finding as to whether the
tortuous act is continuing or permanent, because this has a
direct bearing on the statute.
If in fact the tort is considered permanent, that is to say
the type by where one act a permanent injury is done and damages
are assessed once and for all, then the statute runs from that
time.

If however, it is continuing in nature, as in this case,

where the nuisance was noise and continued over a period of time,
then

the

statute,

if

filed

properly,

includes

any

damages

accruing within the statutory period proceeding, the commencement
of the action.
The Court further states that:
It has been recognized that in doubtful
cases, the Plaintiff should have the election
to treat the nuisance tort as either
permanent or not. (Id at 871)
Applying this
Plaintiff's

rationale to the case at bar, it is the

contention

continuing activity.

that

the

tortuous

acts

followed

one

That is to say, beginning with the unlawful

entry of the Plaintiff's home, the assault, battery and verbal
use, the forcing the Plaintiff to the hospital, the force used in
taking Plaintiff in the police vehicle to the jail, the booking
into the jail, the arrest and the charging, all were a continuous
act with different parts.

The Defendants were all involved

through all stages of the proceedings.

There was not a break in

the activity to the extent that the Plaintiff was left alone, or
that the Defendants' actions stopped and they proceeded in some
11

different action.

But, these Defendants were with this Plaintiff

from approximately 10:30 p.m. on the 28th until 1:30 a.m. on the
2 9th, a three (3) hour continuum.
This does not

fit the concept of a permanent tort and

clearly, based upon that rational, as long as the statute is
applicable to the 29th if any actions took place during the
continuing period, even before that time, they would be included.
Thus, the actions for battery, verbal abuse and the forced taking
of the Plaintiff from her home, although taking place on the
2 8th, would be included in the entire tortuous act.
This

Court

should

also consider

Branch, 720 P.2d 239 (1986) Montana.

the case

of Shores v.

The Montana Court held that

torts can be recognized as continuing when the tortuous act can
be readily abated, even though it is not.

Thus, in a continuing

tort,

occurring within the

recovery

may

be had

for damages

statutory period proceeding the commencement of the action.
In this case, the tortuous acts could have been readily
abated.

Initially, following the confrontation at the house, the

officers could have left.

They could have left the Plaintiff

after she was treated at the hospital.

They could have returned

her to her home and taken no further action.

Instead, rather

than abating their conduct, they continued on a course which
eventually resulted in the Plaintiff's arrest and incarceration
in the Weber County Jail.
Plaintiff . strongly

contends

therefore,

that

allegations in this case constitute a continuing tort.
12

all

the

That the

actions beginning on the night of the 28th and ending on the
early morning hours of the 29th were part of one continuing
episode.

From the time of the initial trespass to the booking in

the Weber County Jail.
of the Defendants7

There was no abatement and therefore, any

actions which were part of the continuum

beginning on the 28th can be brought within the filing on the
29th.
The Court was therefore, in error in not treating this'as a
continuing tort and allowing the case to proceed on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court basically decided a case which had been
pending for almost two years after discovery had been taken and
no Motions had been filed by the Defendants approximately three
(3) weeks prior to Trial on a Motion for Summary Judgment based
upon lack of jurisdiction due to the application of the one year
statute

of

limitations

required

to

file

a

claim

against a

governmental entity of its employee.
The Court, in reviewing while Plaintiff concedes that the
statute of limitations is jurisdictional, the Court is a Court of
equity, has the discretion to consider all the facts in reviewing
an argument concerning the statute of limitations to determine
whether or not the Plaintiff in a case will be barred from its
just remedy due to a strict limitation filing.
In this case, Plaintiff provided the Court with two options
with which to allow the case to continue on the merits.
first was the amendment

The

of the Complaint prior to Trial to
13

comport with the facts to include the activities of the 2 9th of
August, along with those of the 28th.

Although this did not

change the complexity of the case, nor the basic facts, the
witnesses all of which had been known to the Defendants and their
counsel for in excess of two (2) years and did not in any way
prejudice the presentation of all the evidence on the merits fron
either side, the Court chose not to allow this, even though
Courts have readily allowed this practice in Utah, both before,
during and at the end of Trial.
The Court clearly abused its discretion in that decision.
Notwithstanding that improper ruling, the Court, could have also
treated, and without deciding that issue, the actions complained
of in the original'Complaint and the Complaint as it was allowed
to be amended by the Court as one continuing tortuous act, thus
bringing in the allegations of the 28th to those of the 29th.
The Court refused

to this and again, Plaintiff believes

committed prejudicial error.
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court
review

the

applicable

law

as

it

applies

to

this

case and

determine that in fact the Court made an error in not allowing
either the amending of the Complaint or treating the matter as
continuous tort and return the cas^ £cft fCpf^al on the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

t^i

JOHN
Attorney for Appellant
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63-30-13

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
within a year after the cause of action arose,
they filed notice of claim with the attorney
general and the agency concerned on the same
day they filed the original complaint with the
court, and amended complaint alleging compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year
after denial of the claim or after the end of the
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to
have been denied. Johnson v. U t a h State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).

C o m p l i a n c e w i t h section.
Complaint alleging that tax commission and
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in
attempting to enforce payment of excise taxes
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety
in greater amount than was reasonable to ensure payment of the tax. requesting damages
both compensatory and punitive was fatally
defective in t h a t it did not allege compliance
with this section; tax commission and its agent
were immune from suit for damages where the
acts complained of were performed in good
faith and within the statutory authority
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446
(1972).
Plaintiffs complied with this section where,

Quiet title a c t i o n s .
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with
this section if it is given not more t h a n one
year after plaintiffs right to possession has
been disturbed or encroached upon by the
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. J u r . 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126.
C.J.S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272,
310.

A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth
under § 63-30-11.
K e y N u m b e r s . — States &=> 174, 177, 197.

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under Subsection 63-30-11(4).
H i s t o r y : L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1983 amendment inserted 'for against its employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority"; substituted "claim arises" for "cause of action arises";

and added "or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsection
63-30-11(4)."
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations not subject to
this section, § 63-30-5.
Mailing claims to state or political subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Claims barred.
Claims by minors.
Claims for death.
Construction and application.
Contract action.
Estoppel.
Full compliance required.
Necessity for presentation of claim.
Notice.

328

JOY L. SANDERS
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Officer
Wallerstein
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City,' Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
ANDREW M. MORSE
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for. Defendant Officer
Jensen
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
DALE J. LAMBERT
ROBERT K. HILDER
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys for Defendant Officer
Smith
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS

OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, OFFICER
STEVEN WALLERSTEIN, and OFFICER
STEVEN SMITH,

Civil No. 94172

Defendants

This matter having come on for hearing before the Honorable
David E. Roth on the 2nd day of November, 1987, plaintiff being

represented by John T. Caine, defendant Dean Jensen being
represented by Andrew M. Morse, defendant Steven Wallerstein
being represented by Joy L. Sanders, and defendant Steven Smith
being represented by Dale J. Lambert, the Court having heard
oral argument, having reviewed the memoranda, exhibits, and ;.
affidavits, and with good cause appearing therefor, does now
enter its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That during the late evening hours of August 28, 1983,

the defendant police officers were acting in the course and
scope of their duties when an altercation broke out at
plaintiff's home.

Prior to midnight on the 28th, plaintiff was

arrested, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, and taken to
McKay Dee Hospital where she was examined for possible injuries
resulting from the altercation with police.
2.

The certified copy of plaintiff's medical records from

McKay Dee Hospital shows that she was admitted for her
examination at 11:38 p.m. on August 28, 1983.

After the

examination was completed, she was transferred to the Weber
County Sheriff's Department where she was booked at 1:20 a.m.
on August 29, 1983.
3.

On August 29, 1984, Plaintiff filed a notice of claim

alleging trespass and assault.

The notice of claim was filed

one year and one day after the alleged trespass and assault.
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4.

All acts complained of in plaintiff's Complaint

occurred on August 28, 1983.
5.

Plaintiff's notice of claim did not comply with Utah

Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended).
6.

Plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of

;

disorderly conduct as a result of the altercation on August 28,
1983.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiff's claims arising from the alleged

assault and trespass on August 28, 1983, are barred by
plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice of claim
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended).
2.

That since plaintiff's arrest occurred on August 28,

1983, an Amended Complaint as requested by plaintiff, to
include a claim for false or unlawful arrest would also be
barred by plaintiff's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann,
§ 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). •
3.

Although plaintiff has requested leave to amend to

include a claim for malicious prosecution, that cause of action
is quite different from the causes of action defendants were
put on notice of in plaintiff's notice of claim and in
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plaintiff's Complaint and would, therefore, be improper as well
as untimely.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' Motion foi»
Summary Judgment is granted and that plaintiff's Complaint is
dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, without costs.
DATED this / y

day of November, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

V J mo

Sfavid E.HKbth
District Court Judge
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